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ABSTRACT
Purpose: The paper challenges agency and stewardship theories’ straw person conceptions of 
human behaviour and discusses how the board of directors can use accounting and control 
systems to effectively moderate a realistic model of the CEO’s behaviour. 
Design/methodology/approach: The paper uses a pragmatic approach in reconciling agency 
and stewardship theory.
Findings: As well as a framework for implementing strategy, Robert Simons’ levers of control 
can be used to regulate the behaviour of the CEO.  Beliefs and interactive control systems 
encourage pro-organisational behaviour, whereas boundary and diagnostic control systems 
constrain self-interested (or opportunistic) behaviour.  
Originality/value: Assuming people are opportunistic leads to accounting and control systems 
which encourage opportunistic behaviour and discourage pro-organisational behaviour.  
Assuming people are pro-organisational leads to accounting and control systems which an 
opportunistic CEO can exploit.  This paper shows how, theoretically, organisations can 
employ the levers of control to resolve this paradox.
Keywords: Corporate governance; Management accounting; Levers of Control; Agency 
Theory; Stewardship Theory
Paper type: Conceptual paper
1. INTRODUCTION
During the bull markets of the 1990s, Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of major corporations 
received billions of share options (Frey and Osterloh, 2002; Bebchuk and Fried, 2004).  
Michael Jensen’s prescription of pay-for-performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen 
and Murphy, 1990) appeared to be justified as share options motivated CEOs to maximise 
their companies’ share prices and, thus, aligning the interests of CEOs with those of the 
shareholders.  However, as stock markets turned from bull to bear with the bursting of the 
Internet bubble and then the scandals at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and the like, it became 
apparent that share options combined with stock market pressures to meet quarterly earnings 
targets had led CEOs to act irrationally, myopically and, even, unethically (Leung and 
Cooper, 2003; Madrick, 2003).  Michael Jensen now admits that share option schemes 
motivated CEOs to keep share prices up, even if this meant lying to the stock markets and 
creating fictitious financial statements (Cassidy, 2002; Jensen and Murphy, 2009).  To 
prevent the reoccurrence of this incentive problem, Alfred Rappaport, Michael Jensen and 
others have argued for indexed share options (Cassidy, 2002).  The 2008 global financial 
meltdown, however, reminds people that this incentive problem remains.  
Agency theory assumes that CEOs are self-interested (Lubatkin, 2005) – and the 
aforementioned events appear to support this assumption – meaning that incentives such as 
share options and controls such as independent directors and auditors are needed to curb 
CEOs’ opportunistic decision-making (Solomon, 2007).  However, the late Sumantra Ghoshal 
was not convinced that all individuals including CEOs are self-interested (Ghoshal and 
Moran, 1996; Ghoshal, 2005; Rocha and Ghoshal, 2006).  He believed that assuming CEOs
are self-interested would lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy.  What if CEOs are social actors
interpreting and responding to social pressures (Morgan and Smircich, 1980).  Sumantra 
Ghoshal argued that CEOs are socialised through business schools, consultants and 
management gurus to believe that people are self-interested (also see Miller, 1999).  Further, 
using share options to control the behaviour of CEOs reinforces this belief as CEO wealth is 
linked to the company share price.  Maximising the share price in the short-term becomes a 
rationalised myth or social norm for CEOs.  Bruno Frey’s crowding-out theory adds further 
weight to this argument (Frey and Jegen, 2001; Frey and Osterloh, 2002, 2005).  He argues 
that while CEOs are motivated by intrinsic and extrinsic rewards, increasing potential 
extrinsic rewards can crowd-out potential intrinsic rewards (also see Deci and Ryan, 2001).  
For example, while a car salesperson may enjoy assisting their clients in finding the car which 
best suits the clients’ needs, this intrinsic reward can be crowded out by the pressure of sales 
targets and commission-only income.  
Agency theorists argue that if incentives are not used to motivate CEOs then they would shirk 
their duties or build empires (Fama and Jensen, 1983a,b).  As salary and company size are 
positively related, CEOs without performance-based incentives will aim to increase revenues 
and accumulate assets (Murphy, 1999; Tosi et al., 2000).  However, Lex Donaldson disputes 
that all CEOs are self-interested.  He proposed stewardship theory which assumes that CEOs 
are self-actualising and collective-serving (Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson and Davis, 1991; 
Davis et al., 1997).  Under stewardship theory assumptions, CEOs are pro-organisational and 
act in the best interests of shareholders, meaning that performance-based incentives are not 
necessary.  Stewardship theory is the anti-thesis of agency theory.  Based on the empirical 
evidence, it is not clear whether agency or stewardship theory has greater explanatory power 
(Muth and Donaldson, 1998; Kang and Zardkoohi, 2005).  The problem for stewardship 
theorists is convincing boards of directors, shareholders and regulators that CEOs (and other 
managers) can be trusted.  Barrack Obama’s rhetoric on the evils of CEO bonuses
underscores this problem (Shear, 2010; Cho and Appelbaum 2010).  Thus the paradox of 
CEO pay, boards of directors cannot risk trusting CEOs to do their duty without controls and 
incentives, and they cannot risk offering incentives to CEOs without encouraging the 
opportunistic, myopic behaviour they are seeking to avoid.  
To resolve the paradox of CEO pay requires academics to move beyond either/or thinking 
(Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003; Dalton and Dalton, 2005; Roberts et al., 2005).  Neither 
agency nor stewardship theory’s straw person conceptions of CEO behaviour are realistic.  
Aside from a small percentage of organisational psychopaths (Bobby, 2006), the majority of 
CEOs are both self-serving and collective-serving.  They want to act in the best interests of 
the company and shareholders.  They are motivated by intrinsic (e.g. challenge and 
enjoyment) and extrinsic (e.g. money and status) rewards.  But the behaviour of CEOs is not
necessarily homogenous, static and unambiguous; they may act as an agent one day and as a 
steward another day (Angwin et al., 2004).  Drawing on a Robert Simons’ Levers of Control 
(Simons, 1991, 1995a,b, 1999, 2000), this paper reconciles the differences between agency 
and stewardship theory, and then shows how accounting and control systems can moderate 
the behaviour of CEOs.  It is argued that beliefs and interactive control systems encourage 
pro-organisational behaviour, whereas boundary and diagnostic control systems constrain 
self-interested (or opportunistic) behaviour.  The accounting and control systems must be 
designed to account for the complex and dynamic behaviour of CEOs.  
The theoretical framework described in this paper is generally untested as while there has 
been much research interest in Robert Simons’ Levers of Control (e.g. Bisbe and Otley, 2004; 
Widener, 2007), studies have not examined the levers of control in the boardroom.  Further, 
aside from Lee Parker’s research (Parker, 2003, 2007, 2008), there has been scant research on 
how boards of directors use accounting and control systems.  In a similar vein to this paper, 
Seal (2006, p.405) argues that strategic management accounting “strengthens the input of 
non-executive directors and other actors who may wish to hold senior executives to account.”  
While Seal (2006) offers a re-conceptualisation of agency theory – institutional theory of 
agency – and argues that the board of directors should use strategic management accounting 
to manage CEOs, this paper integrates agency and stewardship theories and argues that the 
Levers of Control can be used to enable and constrain CEOs.  The remainder of the paper is 
organised as follows: First, agency and stewardship theories assumptions about human nature 
are compared and integrated.  Second, the roles of the board of directors – derived from 
agency and stewardship theories – are compared and integrated.  Third, the role of accounting 
and control systems in the boardroom is considered.  Fourth, how the Levers of Control can 
be used to manage CEO behaviour is discussed.  Beliefs, boundary, diagnostic control and 
interactive control systems are described.  Studies into how organisations use the Levers of 
Control are also reviewed.  Fifth, limitations and future research opportunities are explored.  
Sixth, and finally, conclusions are drawn.
2. THEORETICAL CONCEPTIONS OF HUMAN NATURE
Human nature has been conceptualised in many different ways from humans as social animals 
to pursuers of enlightenment (see Lundberg and Young, 2005, Chapter 4).  Agency theory –
rooted in neo-classical economics (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1947) – assumes 
individuals are self-serving and, consequently, goal congruence is achieved through 
management controls (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983a,b).  Self-serving 
individuals seek to maximise their own utility in terms of extrinsic rewards such as wealth 
and status (Jensen and Meckling, 1994; Frey and Osterloh, 2002).  As an agent (or homo-
economicus), the CEO is a narcissist who craves power and influence over others (Khurana, 
2002). Conversely, stewardship theory – rooted in psychology (Maslow, 1943) – assumes 
individuals are self-actualising and, consequently, individuals want to achieve organisational 
goals and coercion is not required (Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson and Davis, 1991).  Self-
actualising individuals seek to maximise their own utility in terms of intrinsic rewards such as 
enjoyment and challenge (Deci and Ryan, 2001; Frey and Osterloh, 2002).  As a steward (or 
homo-actualisus), the CEO is a charismatic leader, who works tirelessly to advance the 
organisation’s interests.  Davis et al. (1997) compares agency and stewardship theory’s
assumptions about human nature across a number of behavioural, psychological and 
situational dimensions (see table 1).
Agency Theory Stewardship Theory
Model of Man [sic]
Behaviour
Economic man [sic]
Self-serving
Self-actualising man [sic]
Collective serving
Psychological
Motivation
Social comparison
Identification
Power
Lower order / economic 
needs (physiological, 
security, economic)
Extrinsic
Other managers
Low value commitment
Institutional (legitimate, 
coercive, reward)
Higher order needs (growth, 
achievement, self-
actualisation)
Intrinsic
Principal
High value commitment
Personal (expert, referent)
Situational Mechanisms
Management Philosophy
Risk orientation
Time frame
Objective
Cultural differences
Control oriented
Control mechanisms
Short term
Cost control
Individualism
High power distance
Involvement oriented
Trust
Long term
Performance enhancement
Collectivism
Low power distance
Table 1: Theoretical Conceptions of Human Nature (Davis et al., 1997, p.37)
Agency and stewardship theory’s conceptions of human nature appear to be dichotomous (or 
opposing positions); either the CEO is an agent or a steward.  Davis et al.’s (1997) principal-
manager choice model exemplifies this dichotomy.  However, CEO behaviour is not 
homogenous throughout the world as social norms about CEO behaviour vary between 
countries (Tosi and Greckhamer, 2004; Bruce et al., 2005) and ownership structures such as 
family-controlled businesses (Miller and LeBreton-Miller, 2006).  There is no universal 
model of human behaviour; human factors such as beliefs, cognitive abilities, needs and 
personality, and environmental factors such as culture, laws, norms and organisational 
structure influence in varying ways how humans behave (Furnham, 2005).  For example, in 
an experimental study of incentives, Fong and Tosi (2007, p.161) found “conscientious 
individuals do not shirk with or without agency controls.”  Perhaps instead of hiring 
charismatic CEOs which turn out to be narcissistic (Khurana, 2002), boards of directors 
should seek CEOs which are conscientious.  Thus, agency and stewardship conceptions of 
human nature are naïve, overly-simplistic and, as Samantra Ghoshal would argue, bad for 
practice.  A pragmatic (or realistic) conception of human nature is that agent-like and steward-
like behaviour are extreme positions on a continuum.  CEO behaviour is likely to be 
distributed in some manner along this continuum.  CEOs are human beings and as such are 
not lightning calculators of expected utility (Veblen, 1919), but are part-rational and part-
emotional, and susceptible to socialisation (Furnham, 2005).  CEOs may act as agents one day 
and stewards another day.  What is certain is that the behaviour of CEOs is not homogenous, 
static and predictable; it will vary from day to day as human and environmental factors
change.
3. THE ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 
The role of the board of directors has been conceptualised in many different ways from rubber 
stamping (Mace, 1971) to resource providers (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  Drawing on their 
assumptions about human nature, agency and stewardship theory generate opposing 
conclusions about the role of the board of directors.  Agency theorists argue that as the CEO 
is self-interested, the board of directors must monitor and control the behaviour of CEO and 
ensure that the CEO’s interests are aligned to those of the shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983a,b).  On the other hand, stewardship theorists argue that as the 
CEO is self-actualising, the board of directors should collaborate with the CEO and use their 
collective knowledge and skill to add value to the organisation (Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson 
and Davis, 1991).  Agency theorists believe that trust and commitment between the board of 
directors and the CEO is not sufficient to solve organisation problems without incentives; 
whereas stewardship theorists believe the opposite (Merchant et al., 2003).  These opposing 
roles of the board have been conceptualised in different, yet comparable ways (see table 2).  
Agency theorists prescribe a conformance role for the board of directors; they must ensure 
that the CEO’s behaviour conforms to shareholders’ expectations.  Stewardship theorists 
prescribe a performance role for the board of directors; they must work with the CEO in order 
to meet the shareholders’ expectations.  Thus, the role of the board of directors can be either 
to minimise agency costs or to maximise organisational performance (Davis et al., 1997).
Agency Theory Stewardship Theory
Donaldson (1990) Control Coordination
Davis et al. (1997) Control Involvement
Hung (1998) Conformance
Control
Performance
Strategic
Muth and Donaldson (1998) Managerial Control Managerial Empowerment
Westphal (1999) Independent Collaborative
Merchant et al. (2003) Monitor
Control
Reinforce
Empower
Sundaramurthy and Lewis 
(2003)
Discipline
Monitor
Service
Advise
Overall Minimise agency costs Maximise organisational 
performance
Table 2: Theoretical Conceptions of Role of the Board of the Directors
The two opposing roles of the board of directors have significant implications for corporate 
governance.  The word ‘governance’ has its origins in captaining a ship; steering and keeping 
in good order (Farrar, 2001).  Corporate governance is thus concerned with how the board of 
directors oversees the organisation and manages the CEO (Farrar, 2001; du Plessis et al., 
2005).  Three major components of corporate governance are CEO remuneration, board 
structure and board process.  Agency and stewardship theory’s have opposing prescriptions
for these components of corporate governance (see table 3).  Determining how and how much 
to remunerate the CEO is a critical issue for the board of directors, particularly under agency 
theory’s assumptions of a self-interested, extrinsically motivated CEO.  Under stewardship 
theory, the board of directors needs to consider both financial and intangible rewards.  
Ensuring the CEO is both challenged by and enjoys their work is not an easy task, as 
psychologists can attest (Furnham, 2005).  Also, determining the structure of the board has 
been a much debated issue, particularly since the Enron and Andersen scandals (du Plessis et 
al., 2005; Seal, 2006; Solomon, 2007). Agency theorists argue for the separation of the CEO 
and Chair, a board comprising mainly independent directors and a large number of directors 
including representatives of institutional investors (Solomon, 2007).  Stewardship theorists 
argue for the opposite (Davis et al., 1997).  The empirical evidence is, however, mixed and 
contingent (Kang and Zardkoohi, 2005).  Finally, the board of directors needs to determine
how to relate to the CEO in terms of relationships, involvement, culture, and function
(Westphal, 1999; Leblanc and Gilles, 2005; Roberts et al., 2005).  Agency theorists argue that 
the board of directors should be impassionate observers of the CEO, whereas stewardship 
theorists argue that they should be passionate friends of the CEO (Davis et al., 1997).  While 
board process has received scant attention in the literature (Pye and Pettigrew, 2005), the 
empirical evidence suggests that the board of directors needs to be both a monitor of and an 
advisor to the CEO (Westphal, 1999; Leblanc and Gilles, 2005).
Agency Theory Stewardship Theory
CEO Remuneration
- Philosophy
- Focus of Rewards
- Purpose of incentives
- Measures
- Size of (potential) bonus
Variable 
Extrinsic
Alignment and motivation
Financial
Large
Fixed
Intrinsic
Goal-setting
Non-financial
Small
Board Structure
- Role of the CEO
- Type of directors
- Role of independent 
directors
- Size of the board
Separate CEO and Chair 
Independent directors
Representatives
Large
Combined CEO and Chair
Affiliated/Executive
Expert advisors
Small
Board Process
- Relationships
- Involvement
- Culture
- Function
Arm’s length
Low
Adversarial
Monitoring
Close social ties
High
Collaborative
Advise
Table 3: Theoretical Conceptions of Corporate Governance
While agency and stewardship theory appear to have dichotomous conceptions of the role of 
the board of directors and how the board should govern an organisation, these conceptions are 
not incompatible.  Boards of directors are generally not comprised of entirely independent 
(non-executive) directors or executive directors, particularly in large corporations.  Solomon 
(2007, p.95) concludes that “the majority of empirical evidence endorses the roles of both 
non-executive and executive directors… Both groups of directors bring different but essential 
skills to the boardroom.”  The board of directors can monitor and advise the CEO (and his/her 
executive team).  Directors within a board can have different but equally important roles 
(Leblanc and Gilles, 2005).  Also, directors can switch roles from being an evaluator of the 
CEO’s performance to a collaborator on the CEO’s strategic plan.  The reality of the 
relationship between the board of directors and the CEO is that while it is complex and 
dynamic, both control and collaboration are necessary to meet shareholder’s expectations 
(Tricker, 2009).  For example, in a US study of social ties between directors and the CEO, 
and boardroom collaboration in strategic decision-making, Westphal (1999, p.19) found 
“CEO-board collaboration and control are independently and positively related to subsequent 
firm performance.”  While agency and stewardship theorists advocate opposing roles and 
corporate governance practices, the empirical evidence suggests that the effective boards 
operate between these two extreme positions, combining elements of both (Roberts et al., 
2005; Solomon, 2007; Tricker, 2009).
4. ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL SYSTEMS IN THE BOARDROOM
Accounting and control systems provide managers and, presumably, directors with 
information for planning, controlling and decision-making (Anthony and Govindarajan, 
2007).  However, the literature is almost silent on what management accounting information 
boards of directors want and use, and how boards of directors design or use accounting and 
control systems.  Searching Google Scholar, corporate governance journals and management 
accounting journals yields few studies on accounting and control systems in the boardroom.  
For example, a search of Corporate Governance: An International Review using the keyword 
‘budget’ yields no hits.  For example, a search of Management Accounting Research using the 
keywords ‘corporate governance’ and ‘board of directors’ yielded 60 and 50 hits, 
respectively, but few of these papers discuss how the board of directors uses accounting and 
control systems.  Similarly, there is not more than a few pages dedicated to the use of 
accounting and control systems by the board of directors in management accounting (e.g. 
Anthony and Govindarajan, 2007; Merchant and van der Stede, 2007; Bhimani et al., 2008; 
Dury, 2008) and corporate governance (e.g. Farrar, 2001; Monks and Minow, 2004; du 
Plessis et al., 2005; Solomon, 2007; Tricker, 2009) texts.  Notable exceptions include Lee 
Parker’s research on financial accountability in the boardrooms of not-for-profit organisations 
(Parker, 2003, 2007, 2008), and CIMA’s (Chartered Institute of Management Accountants) 
discussion and best practice papers on enterprise governance (CIMA, 2003, 2004, 2005,
2007a,b, 2009a,b, 2010).
Merchant and van der Stede (2007, p.577) believe that “Corporate governance systems and 
management control systems (MCSs) are inextricably linked… Changes in corporate 
governance mechanisms and practices will usually have immediate and direct effects on the 
effectiveness of MCSs”, although they provide few examples of these relationships.  Given 
the dearth of empirical evidence on the use of accounting and control systems in the 
boardroom, the following discussion is somewhat speculative.  CIMA (2004, 2009a) 
prescribes that enterprise governance includes planning, budgeting, performance 
management, cost management, investment appraisal, etc.  However, how the adoption and 
use of these accounting and control systems varies under agency and stewardship theory’s 
assumptions has not been discussed in the literature.  Davis et al. (1997) provide some clues 
as they argue that in a principal-agent relationship, the board will focus on short-term cost 
control; whereas in a principal-steward relationship, the board will focus on long-term 
performance enhancement.  Therefore, control (discipline, monitoring or surveillance) 
characters accounting and control systems under agency theory; whereas collaboration 
characterises them under stewardship theory.  Traditional accounting and control systems 
such as centralisation, incremental budgeting, standard costing and ROI are characterised by 
control.  Contemporary accounting and control systems such as decentralisation, zero-based 
budgeting (or beyond budgeting), total quality management and balanced scorecard are 
characterised by collaboration.  The notions of control/traditional versus 
collaboration/contemporary are used to determine how accounting and control systems vary 
under agency and stewardship theory (see table 4).
Agency Theory Stewardship Theory
Planning 
- Focus
- Horizon
- Level of board 
involvement
Cost reductions
Short-term (1-3 years)
Review and approve the 
CEO’s plan
Competitors and customers
Long-term (3-5 years)
Collaborate with CEO in 
formulating the plan
Budgeting
- Type
- Use
- Level of board 
involvement
- Reaction to variances
- Revisions allowed
Incremental
Performance evaluation
Review and approve the 
CEO’s budget
CEO faces punitive measures
No
Strategic
Planning
Collaborate with CEO in 
formulating the budget
Collaborative investigation
Yes
Performance Management (or 
Management Control)
- Culture
- Measures
- Systems
- Evaluation
Management by exception
Financial targets
ROI or EVA
Objective
Management by objective
Non-financial targets
Balanced scorecard
Subjective
Cost Management
- Focus
- Systems
Cost and process
Standard or Activity-based 
costing
Competitor and customer
Strategic-focused systems 
(e.g. TQM, JIT, TOC)
Decision-Making
- Culture
- Investment decisions
- Model of analysis
Centralisation
Discounted cash flow
Organisation value chain 
analysis
Decentralisation
Payback period
Industry value chain analysis
Table 4: Accounting and Control Systems in the Boardroom
It is quite unrealistic to believe that any organisation, even if their CEO is an agent or 
steward, would alter all of their accounting and control systems to better suit the behavioural 
(or psychological) profile of the CEO.  However, given that there is almost no empirical 
evidence on how CEO behaviour influences the board of directors’ choice or use of 
accounting and control systems, it is impossible to construct a realistic view.  As the average 
CEO is likely part-agent and part-steward, it is conceivable that the board of directors will 
employ some traditional and contemporary accounting and control systems in order to control 
and collaborate with the CEO.  But which accounting and control systems are more important 
and under what circumstances is, at this point, unknown.  Large publically-listed companies 
do, however, include much information in their annual reports on how the board of directors 
(and its sub-committees) formulates, implements and monitors strategy as well as how the 
CEO is remunerated (e.g. performance measures) and why they are remunerated in this 
manner (e.g. remuneration principles) (CIMA, 2009b).  Thus, it is probable that boards of 
directors do use accounting and control systems, but there is scant empirical evidence. There 
have been many calls for research into the boardroom (Davis et al., 1997; Sundaramurthy and 
Lewis, 2003).  Academics have begun to respond with in-depth analyses of board practices 
and processes (e.g. Leblanc and Gilles, 2005; Roberts et al., 2005; Parker, 2008) as well as 
models of strategy (Pugliese et al., 2009) and behaviour (van Ees et al., 2009) in the 
boardroom.  
The board of directors and the CEO set ‘the tone at the top’ which will influence the choice 
and use of accounting and control systems (Anthony and Govindarajan, 2007).  When an 
organisation’s decision-making is centralised, the accounting and control systems which are 
chosen and emphasised at the top of the organisation are likely to be cascaded down 
management hierarchy of the organisation.  When an organisation’s decision-making is 
decentralised, the accounting and control systems are not necessarily choice at the top of the 
organisation, but the board of directors and the CEO are likely to still deploy accounting and 
control systems to gather intelligence, assess performance and allocate resources.  Irrespective 
of whether decision-making is centralised (top-down) or decentralised (bottom-up), the board 
of directors will need draw on information from the organisation’s accounting and control 
systems to govern the organisation and CEO.  CIMA (2004) found that the success or failure 
of an organisation’s board of directors is dependent on the tone at the top and the 
development of accounting and control systems (e.g. a strategic scorecard).  Having well-
designed accounting and control systems are critical in successfully formulating and 
implementing an organisation’s strategy (CIMA, 2004, 2005, 2010).  Drawing on Robert 
Simons’ Levers of Control, this paper provides a pragmatic model of how the board of 
directors can use accounting and control systems to moderate the CEO’s behaviour.
5. THE LEVERS OF CONTROL IN THE BOARDROOM
As originally conceived, Robert Simons’ Levers of Control describe how managers can 
implement and control business strategy (Simons, 1995b).  There are three major 
organisational tensions which Simons (1995b, p.153) argues the Levers of Control manage: 
“(1) unlimited opportunity versus limited attention, (2) intended strategy versus emergent 
strategy, and (3) self-interest versus the desire to contribute.”  To implement and control 
business strategy, managers need to identify the organisation’s core values, risks to be 
avoided, strategic uncertainties and critical performance variables.  Beliefs, boundary, 
interactive control and diagnostic control systems are used to manage these aspects of 
business strategy, respectively (Simons 1995b, 2000).  Drawing on the metaphor of yin and 
yang (or positive and negative), Simons (1995b) argues that beliefs systems inspire managers
while boundary systems limits their imagination, and interactive control systems focuses 
managers attention on new opportunities while diagnostic control systems ensure managers 
control day-to-day operations.  Ferreira and Otley (2009) believe that the Levers of Control 
framework is both broadly empirically valid and practically useful for managers. However, it 
is pitched at the senior management (or divisional) level of the organisation and is concerned 
with business strategy.  Simons (1995b; 2000) provides little guidance on how the Levers of 
Control framework can be applied to the governance level.  This section presents a modified 
version of the Levers of Control and then discusses how the levers can be used to moderate 
the behaviour of the CEO.
At the governance level of the organisation, the board of directors is concerned with hiring, 
managing and replacing the CEO as well as managing relationships with shareholders and 
other stakeholders (du Plessis et al., 2005; Solomon, 2007; Tricker, 2009).  The board of 
directors needs to collaborate with the CEO to formulate the organisational strategy (or, at 
least, review and approve the CEO’s organisational strategy), as well as monitoring and 
advising on the implementation of the strategy and then reviewing the performance of the 
organisation and the CEO relative to this intended organisational strategy (Hitt et al., 2007).  
Of course, the organisation will need to modify or change the intended strategy as conditions 
change (e.g. new competitors, customers or regulators) (Simons, 2000).  For the board of 
directors, managing the CEO through control, collaboration or both is part of managing the 
organisational strategy.  The same major tensions which Simons (1995b) identifies for 
managers also exist for the board of directors.  Instead of characterising the CEO’s behaviour 
as either self-serving or collective-serving (or “the desire to contribute”, Simons, 1995b, 
p.153), Simons (1995b) argues there is a tension between the behaviours.  This is consistent 
with the aforementioned pragmatic conception of the CEO’s behaviour.  Thus neither agency 
nor stewardship theory have superior explanatory power because in a complex, dynamic 
social reality, the CEO’s behaviour can be both agent-like and steward-like.  Therefore, the 
board of directors needs to use the Levers of Control to moderate the CEO’s behaviour.
The Levers of Control provides a framework1 for describing or prescribing how the board of 
directors can use accounting and control systems to manage the CEO’s behaviour (see figure 
1).  Beliefs systems – which communicate core values – can encourage the CEO to think in 
terms of the organisation’s best interests.  Boundary systems – which monitor risks to be 
avoided – can curb the myopic tendencies of the CEO.  Interactive control systems – which 
focus on strategic uncertainties – can encourage collaboration between the board of directors 
and the CEO. Diagnostic control systems – which monitor critical performance variables –
can ensure that the CEO is held accountable to the board of directors.  However, whether or 
not any boards of directors use accounting and control systems in this manner is unknown.  
Contingency theorists have shown that accounting and control systems influence
organisational performance, and their design and use is contingent/dependent on a variety of 
factors such as strategy (Langfield-Smith, 2006).  Contingency theory supports Simons 
(1995b, 2000) argument that organisational performance can be maximised by aligning 
accounting and control systems – through the Levers of Control – with business strategy.  
Crowding out theory (Frey and Osterloh, 2002) and cognitive evaluation theory (Deci and 
Ryan, 2001) supports Simons (1995b, 2000) argument that there is a tension between self-
serving and collective-serving behaviour.  Empirical evidence also suggests that accounting 
and control systems can influence people’s behaviour and, thus, manage this tension (Bonner 
and Sprinkle, 2002; Merchant et al., 2003).
Encourages the 
CEO to think in 
terms of the 
organisation’s 
best interests 
Curbs the 
myopic 
tendencies of 
the CEO 
 Beliefs
Systems
Boundary 
Systems

 
Core Values Risks to be 
Avoided
 Organisational 
Strategy

 
Strategic 
Uncertainties
Critical 
Performance 
Variables
Encourages 
collaboration 
between the 
board of directors 
and the CEO
  Ensures that the 
CEO is held 
accountable to 
the board of 
directors 
 Interactive 
Control 
Systems
Diagnostic 
Control 
Systems
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(Anthony and Govindarajan, 2007; Merchant and van der Stede, 2007).
Figure 1: The Levers of Control in the Boardroom
5.1. BELIEFS SYSTEMS
Simons (1995b, p.34) defines a beliefs system as “the explicit set of organizational definitions 
that senior managers communicate formally and reinforce systematically to provide basic 
values, purpose and direction for the organization.”  Examples of beliefs systems are mission 
statements, vision statements, credos and statements of purpose (Simons, 1995b). Accounting 
and control systems can be used as beliefs systems. Statements of purpose are used to choose 
and guide the implementation of many accounting and control systems (Simons, 2000; 
Merchant and van der Stede, 2007).  For example, mission and vision statements are 
incorporated into an organisation’s planning and budgeting systems (Langfield-Smith et al., 
2006).  For example, the successful implementation of activity-based costing is dependent on 
the organisation having a clear understanding of its purpose and how it fits with the 
organisation’s strategy (Gosselin, 2007; Major, 2007).  
Researchers have also found that using beliefs systems does benefit organisations. In a case 
study of a UK telecommunications firm, Marginson (2002) found that the case firm’s use of 
beliefs systems had a positive effect on managers’ values and lead to increasing focus on the 
firm’s interests (or strategic direction).  In a longitudinal case study of a Finnish subsidiary 
firm, Tuomela (2005) found that the firm’s performance scorecard acted as a multi-lever of 
control.  As a beliefs system, the performance scorecard communicated the firm’s customer 
focus to managers.  As a multi-lever of control, the performance scorecard aligned the 
managers’ interests with those of the subsidiary and parent firms.  In a survey of Chief 
Financial Officers from US firms, Widener (2007) found that the use of beliefs systems 
focused managerial attention and enhanced organisational learning, which lead to improved 
firm performance. She also found that “the beliefs system influences and complements each 
of the other control systems in the [Levers of Control] framework” (p.779).  Therefore, the 
empirical evidence indicates that beliefs systems can direct managers’ attention and effort 
towards the organisation’s strategy objectives. 
While Simons (1995b, 2000) focuses on the benefits of managers using beliefs systems, he 
provides few clues about the role of the board of directors.  Organisational theorists observe 
and recommend that the board of directors are/be involved in formulating core values and 
communicating these through beliefs systems (Hitt et al., 2007).  In a survey of US Chairmen 
and senior executives, Bart and Bontis (2003) found that board and management involvement 
in developing their company’s mission statement has a positive impact on their commitment 
to the mission and organisational performance. They conclude that “it is recommended that 
board involvement with a mission’s development – and continuous awareness of it – need to 
be both recognized and formally in an organization’s governance structure…” (p.378).  
Therefore, the board of directors should work with the CEO to formulate and communicate 
the organisation’s core values through the organisation’s beliefs systems, and such actions 
will have positive effects on CEO behaviour and organisational performance.
Proposition 1: If the board of directors and CEO use beliefs systems to implement the 
organisation’s core values, then the CEO will be more likely to pursue pro-
organisational behaviour.
5.2. BOUNDARY SYSTEMS
Simons (1995b, p.178) defines a boundary system as “formally stated rules, limits and 
proscriptions tied to defined sanctions and credible threat of punishment… to allow individual 
creativity within defined limits of freedom”.  While beliefs systems are positive forces which 
give individuals’ inspiration, boundary systems are (countervailing) negative forces which 
constrain individuals’ imagination.  Examples of boundary systems are codes of business 
conduct, strategic planning systems, asset acquisition systems, and operational guidelines 
(Simons, 1995b). Accounting and control systems can be used as boundary systems such as 
capital and operation budgeting systems which constrain managers’ opportunities (Simons, 
2000; Merchant and van der Stede, 2007).  
Since the Enron and Andersen scandals, the use of codes of ethics in organisations has been 
debated in the literature (Ghoshal, 2005; Locke, 2006; Fleishman and Funnel, 2007).  
Professional accounting associations have also sought to hold their members accountable to a 
higher standard of ethical conduct (Rogers et al., 2005).  Such ethical guidelines shape the 
responsibilities employees and officers have to each other, to clients and to the community 
(Widener, 2007). Simons (1999, p.93) points out that “Establishing unambiguous boundaries 
is a quick but effective way of reining in risk and protecting a firm’s most valuable asset [– its 
reputation].”  Further, Bhimani (2009, p.2) argues that “enterprises seek not only to adopt risk 
controls but also to make the deployment of such controls transparent and visible… This 
makes management accounting, risk management and corporate governance increasingly and 
inextricably interdependent.” 
While Simons (1995b, 1999, 2000) focuses on the benefits of managers using boundary 
systems, he provides few details about the role of the board of directors.  Ethics theorists have 
argued that the board of directors should not only formulate and implement a code of ethics, 
but also demonstrate their compliance with it (Clark and Leonard, 1998; Schwartz, 2002).  
Further, the board of directors should have a risk management system to act as an early 
warning signal (Dulewicz et al., 1995; Mackay and Sweeting, 2002). CIMA (2004) argue that 
the board of directors can use a strategic scorecard to manage enterprise risk.  Risk 
management systems provide the board of directors with information that can be used to 
challenge the strategic direction of the CEO, which is critical to effective corporate 
governance and organisational performance (CIMA, 2004, 2005 2010).  Hitt et al. (2005, 
p.326) argue that “the most effective boards participate actively to set boundaries for their 
firms’ business ethics and values.”  Therefore, the board of directors should work with the 
CEO to formulate and communicate the organisation’s risks to be avoided through the 
organisation’s boundary systems, and such actions will signal to the CEO what is and is not 
appropriate behaviour as well as the consequences of inappropriate behaviour, which will act 
to constrain the CEO’s opportunistic tendencies. 
Proposition 2: If the board of directors and CEO use boundary systems to monitor the 
organisation’s risks to be avoided, then the CEO will be less likely to pursue 
opportunistic behaviour.
5.3. INTERACTIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS
Simons (1995b, p.95) defines an interactive control system as “formal information systems 
managers use to involve themselves regularly and personally in the decision activities of 
subordinates.”  Managers only use one accounting and control system interactively (unless 
facing a crisis) because an interactive control system requires much managerial attention 
(Simons, 1991, 1995b). Examples of interactive control systems are profit planning systems, 
project management systems, brand revenue systems, and intelligence systems (Simons, 
1995b). When an accounting and control system is used interactively, it should generate data 
which is regularly discussed and, consequently, stimulates organisational learning (Simons 
(1999). 
In a survey of large Spanish manufacturing firms, Bisbe and Otley (2004) found that high 
interactive use of management control systems enhanced organisational performance.  In a 
case study of a Finish subsidiary, Tuomela (2005) found that there are both benefits and costs 
of using a strategic scorecard interactively.  Benefits included improving the commitment of 
managers to strategic targets and the quality of decision-making.  Costs included resistance to 
the new management techniques and the amount of managerial time required.  In a survey of 
large US firms, Widener (2007) found that while firms use interactive control systems to 
manage competitive uncertainties and operational risks, using interactive controls systems did 
not contribute to organisational learning.  The benefits of using interactive control systems 
did, however, outweigh the costs as they positively contributed to organisational performance.  
However, these studies do not provide any evidence that the board of directors uses an 
accounting and control system interactively.  After all, interactive control systems are 
supposed to stimulate ideas from the bottom-up and empower lower-level managers and 
employees to think creatively (Simons, 1995b; Simons, 2000).  On the other hand, an 
interactive control system manages strategic uncertainties which vary at different levels in the 
organisation (e.g. the board of directors is concerned with organisational strategy, while a 
division manager is concerned with business strategy).  CIMA (2004, 2010) argue that the 
board of directors should have an active role in formulating, implementing, and monitoring 
organisational strategy. Tricker (2009) argues that the board of directors should be focused 
on the future to ensure that the organisational strategy is attained; whereas boards of directors 
focus too heavily on the past, to their detriment.  Therefore, the board of directors should use 
the organisation’s interactive control systems to engage in dialogue and debate with the CEO 
in order to manage the organisation’s strategic uncertainties, and such actions will have 
positive effects on CEO behaviour and organisational performance.
Proposition 3: If the board of directors and CEO use an interactive control system to 
stimulate dialogue and debate about the organisation’s strategic uncertainties, then the 
CEO will be more like to pursue pro-organisational behaviour. 
5.4. DIAGNOSTIC CONTROL SYSTEMS
Simons (1995b, p.59) defines a diagnostic control system as “the formal information systems 
that managers use to monitor organizational outcomes and correct deviations from preset 
standards of performance.”  Examples of diagnostic control systems are profit plans and 
budgets, goals and objectives systems, project monitoring systems, brand revenue monitoring 
systems, and strategic planning systems (Simons, 1995b).  These examples are recognised as 
accounting and control systems (Simons, 2000; Merchant and van der Stede, 2007). 
Managers use diagnostic control systems to monitor critical performance variables and 
associated financial and non-financial targets.  Incentive schemes are linked to these targets to 
motivate managers and employees.  Managers need to design diagnostic control systems 
carefully to avoid manipulation (Simons, 1995a, 2000).  Once targets are set, managers only 
need to follow-up on significant variances.  Diagnostic control systems allow managers to 
control operations remotely and focus their attention on strategic uncertainties (Simons, 
1995b, 2000).  
Simons (1995b, 2000) focuses on (senior) managers and does not discuss how the board of 
directors might use diagnostic control systems to monitor the CEO.  Some studies suggest that 
boards of directors do not use budgets to effectively monitor strategic and financial outcomes 
(Stiles and Taylor, 2001; Parker, 2003, 2007).  In the wake of Enron and other corporate 
scandals, CIMA (2003, 2004, 2005, 2007a, 2009a, 2010) has argued that the board of 
directors should implement and monitor diagnostic control systems – although CIMA does 
not use this term – such as strategic planning systems, strategic (balanced) scorecards and 
enterprise risk management systems.  CIMA (2004) contends that these diagnostic control 
systems can focus the attention of the board of directors on organisational strategy and lead to 
improved performance.  This is consistent with Simons (1995b, 2000) claims and Widener 
(2007) empirical evidence that diagnostic control systems can improve managerial attention 
and learning and, ultimately, organisational performance.    Therefore, the board of directors 
and the CEO should use diagnostic control systems to monitor the organisation’s critical 
performance variables, the board of directors should hold the CEO accountable for 
achievement of mutually agreed upon targets, and such actions will constrain the CEO’s 
opportunistic tendencies.
Proposition 4: If the board of directors and CEO use diagnostic control systems to 
monitor the organisation’s critical performance variables, then the CEO will be less 
likely to pursue opportunistic behaviour.
5.5. Using accounting and control systems as levers of control 
CIMA (2004) argues that enterprise governance has two dimensions: conformance and 
performance.  Conformance processes ensure that directors and executives are accountable for 
their actions and the information they produce (e.g. corporate annual report) is assured.  The 
board of directors and executives can use performance processes to align the organisational
strategy with the organisation’s structure and systems.  If these processes are carried out 
effectively, then the organisation’s performance will be maximised (Langfield-Smith, 2006).  
Accounting and control systems have a significant role in assisting the board of directors to 
their conformance and performance roles. Robert Simons’ Levers of Control provide a 
framework for determining how the board of directors can utilise accounting and control 
systems.  The empirical evidence from below the governance-level suggests that “managers 
must consider all four control systems when designing their control system” (Widener, 2007, 
p.782).  There is no reason to believe that these findings are not also applicable at the 
governance-level, although future research is needed to verify this supposition.  This paper 
has argued that the board of directors can use beliefs and interactive control systems to 
encourage the CEO to act in organisation’s best interests, and use boundary and diagnostic 
control systems to discourage the CEO to act opportunistically.  Therefore, as the CEO is 
part-agent and part-steward, the board of directors needs to both control and cooperative with 
the CEO to minimise agency costs and maximise organisation performance, and such actions 
can be facilitated through accounting and control systems.
Proposition 5: If the board of directors uses accounting and control systems to 
monitor and collaborate with the CEO, then both agency costs will be minimised and 
organisational performance will be maximised.
6. DISCUSSION
This paper has argued that the board of directors can use the Levers of Control to moderate 
the CEO’s behaviour and, consequently, minimise agency costs and maximise organisational 
performance.  This line of reasoning is somewhat overly-simplistic and idealistic. While the 
CEO is characterised as part-agent and part-steward, this is not a dynamic model of human 
behaviour.  Further research into how the CEO’s behaviour changes over time and what 
triggers these changes is needed.  Simons (1995b, 2000) contends that the Levers of Control 
manage the tension between self-serving and collective-serving behaviour, but this has yet to 
be empirically tested.  The literature has found that humans do respond to accounting and 
control systems, particularly incentive schemes in varying ways (Bonner and Sprinkle, 2002; 
Merchant et al., 2003).  However, the influence of accounting and control systems on CEO 
behaviour has received scant attention.  Further, the applicability of the Levers of Control to 
the governance-level, rather than the divisional-level has not been researched.  CIMA (2004) 
argues that enterprise governance includes conformance and performance processes, and these 
are consistent with the Levers of Control.  But researchers have yet to comprehensively study 
how the board of directors use accounting and control systems.  The majority of the literature 
on corporate governance and management accounting is normative (e.g. CIMA, 2003, 2004, 
2005, 2007a, 2009a, 2010) or theoretical (e.g. Seal, 2006).  As this paper is theoretical, 
practitioners are advised not to view the propositions in this paper as a prescription for 
enhancing organisational performance.  Such as view, as Sumantra Ghoshal would have said, 
is bad for practice.  Further qualitative and quantitative research is needed to investigate how 
accounting and control systems are used in the boardroom.
The propositions presented in this paper are not un-testable, but too broad to be tested in their 
current form. As aforementioned, there is scant research that has studied how boards of 
directors employ accounting and control systems, and no research that has studied Simons’ 
Levers of Control framework at the governance-level.  Descriptive case studies can explore 
the interface between management accounting and corporate governance.  There are many 
unexplored questions related to how much attention directors give to planning, budgeting, 
costing, and performance measurement systems.  The board of directors is cast as the 
approver of plans and budgets (Mace, 1971), but regulators and professional associations 
around the world now expect the board of directors to have an active role in directing the 
organisation (Monk and Minow, 2004; Solomon, 2007).  Tricker (2009) highlights that boards 
of directors still see their role as focused on providing accountability, and monitoring and 
supervising; whereas he argues that they should be focused on strategy formulation and policy 
making.  In any case, accounting and control systems can provide information to support 
these roles.  Using the Levers of Control framework to frame descriptive case studies will 
help researchers understand how directors balance these competing roles.  
Roberts et al. (2005, pp.S21-S22) argue that research should “identify… the keys conditions 
and behaviours that promote effective and intelligent accountability within boards.”  The 
Levers of Control framework provides researchers with the tools to assess the effectiveness of 
the board of directors.  Beliefs, boundary, interactive control and diagnostic control systems 
are all necessary for effective management (Simons, 1995; Ferreira and Otley, 2009).  At this 
point, there is no reason to believe that this is not also true for effective governance.  
Researchers will need to use employ a variety of research methods to not only describe what 
accounting and control systems boards of directors use, but to assess the effectiveness of the
boards of directors use of these systems and the effectiveness of these systems at providing 
useful information to directors.  Interviewing a large sample of directors and executives will 
provide researchers with a deeper understanding of these issues.  
Qualitative research methods can be employed to study and further refine the propositions 
presented in this paper.  The Levers of Control have been studied through case studies (e.g. 
Simons, 1990, 1991; Marginson, 2002; Toumela, 2005).  Researchers could interview and 
observe boards of directors (e.g. Parker, 2003, 2007, 2008) in order to describe what 
accounting and control systems are employed, and explain how and why certain systems are 
favoured.  Case studies should describe how, for example, diagnostic controls differ from
interactive controls at the governance-level.  Typically, boards of directors meet infrequently 
at least formally, but interactive control requires ongoing dialogue and debate.  Perhaps
boards of directors use phone calls and emails to discuss pertinent issues in between formal 
meetings and the issues discussed arise from the interactive control system.  Diagnostic 
control requires period monitoring and investigation.  Boards of directors receive reports from 
management prior to formal meetings (Tricker, 2009).  These reports can include a wide 
range of information, and boards of directors most likely do not investigate the performance 
reported unless it is outside their expectations.  
The traditional characterisation of the board of directors fits with boundary and diagnostic 
control systems, rather than beliefs and interactive control systems.  Case studies should 
examine whether interactive controls are critical to improve the effectiveness of the board of 
directors. Researchers could employ both present and historical case studies to investigate 
these gaps in knowledge.  Interviews or participant observation could be used to study boards 
of directors, but Leblanc and Gilles (2005) note that gaining access to directors, particular 
board meetings is difficult.  Johanson (2008) argues that historical case studies provide a rich 
source of untapped data.  For example, many organisations maintain archives which typically 
include the minutes from the meetings of board of directors.  Gaining access to these archives 
can be problematic if the company still exists, but many archives from defunct companies are 
also preserved.  
Quantitative research methods can be employed to validate or falsify the propositions 
presented in this paper.  The Levers of Control have been studied through surveys (e.g. 
Simons, 1987; Bisbe and Otley, 2004; Widener, 2007).  The propositions in this paper are too 
broad as all accounting and control systems are treated equally.  Drawing on case studies or 
using pilot testing of survey instruments, researchers should focus on specific accounting and 
control systems which boards of directors are most likely to use.  Mission and visions 
statements, codes of ethics, strategic plans, budgets and scorecards are the most obvious 
starting point. Surveys can be used to which accounting and control systems are used by 
boards of directors, and then how they use them (e.g. diagnostic vs. interactive).  A measure 
of firm performance should be included in the survey, so that the benefits of using accounting 
and control systems in accordance with the Levers of Control framework can be assessed.  
7. CONCLUSION
Agency and stewardship theory have opposing assumptions and predictions with respect to 
CEO behaviour and the role of the board of directors.  The empirical evidence has not clearly 
favoured one theory over the other, although agency theory is more popular amongst
academics (Davis et al., 1997; du Plessis et al., 2005; Kang and Zardkoohi, 2005; Lubatkin, 
2005).  This paper argues that adopting a more realistic model of human behaviour and 
boardroom dynamics will resolve the impasse.  Further, this paper draws on Robert Simon’s 
Levers of Control framework to explain how the board of directors can manage the CEO.  It is 
argued that to maximise organisational performance, the board of directors needs to use 
accounting and control systems to implement strategy and moderate the CEO’s behaviour.  
Essentially, this paper has laid the foundations of a combined agency-stewardship theory of 
corporate governance.  However, it is acknowledged that such a theory is in its early stages of 
development.  CEO behaviour has been scantly studied in psychology. The interface between 
corporate governance and management accounting has also received little academic attention 
(Seal, 2006).  Further, studies using the Levers of Control framework have been focused at 
the division-level of organisations, rather than the governance-level.  Therefore, it is hoped 
that this paper will stimulate much discussion, debate and, ultimately, research, so that the use 
of accounting and control systems in the boardroom can be better understood. 
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